Kay Berger, Inc., Marvin Chernow and Marilyn Chernow v. David Hooper and Mansell and Associates : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Kay Berger, Inc., Marvin Chernow and Marilyn
Chernow v. David Hooper and Mansell and
Associates : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David O. Black; Black Stith & Argyle, Attorneys for Appellants.
D. Gary Christian; Michael F. Skolnick; Kipp and Christian; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Kay Berger Inc v. Hooper, No. 950745 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6965
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAY BERGER, INC., MARVIN 
CHERNOW AND MARILYN CHERNOW, 
Plaintiffs and Kay Berger, Inc., 
Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID HOOPER and MANSELL & 
ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
qfolifS* <L4 
No. 950200 
930905391CV 
&/£ 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, KAY BERGER, INC. 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
David O. Black, #0346 
BLACK STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
1245 East Brickyard Road, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3017 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
mm Gomt m APPZMM 
mm 
D. Gary Christian, #0652 
Michael F. Skolnick, #4671 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellee Kay Berger, Inc. 
FILED 
NOV 1 7 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAY BERGER, INC., MARVIN 
CHERNOW AND MARILYN CHERNOW, 
Plaintiffs and Kay Berger, Inc., 
Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID HOOPER and MANSELL & 
ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 950200 
930905391CV 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, KAY BERGER, INC. 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
David O. Black, #0346 
BLACK STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
1245 East Brickyard Road, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3017 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
D. Gary Christian, #0652 
Michael F. Skolnick, #4671 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellee Kay Berger, Inc. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
RELEVANT FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. The Third District Court correctly held that the 
uncontroverted material facts support summary 
judgment in favor of Kay Berger, Inc., based upon 
the equitable theory of promissory estoppel 11 
A. The material, uncontroverted facts support 
summary judgment 11 
B. The elements of promissory estoppel have been met 13 
1. Promise 13 
2. Reasonable Reliance 15 
3. Detriment 17 
C. Public policy grounds support the Third District 
Court's Order granting summary judgment 18 
H. The Third District Court correctly held that Berger 
adequately pled her causes of action 18 
CONCLUSION 20 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.. 848 P.2d 
171 (Utah App. 1993) 13 
Blackham v. Snelgrove. 3 U.2d 157, 160, 
280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955) 19 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) 3 
Roberton v. Sixpense Inns, of America. Inc.. 789 P.2d 
1040, 1047 (Ariz. 1990) 16 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 
486 (Utah App. 1991) 16 
Weese v. Davis Countv Comm'n. 834 P.2d 1, n.17 (Utah 1992) 13 
RULES 
Rules and Regulations Governing the Operation of the Multiple Listing Service 
of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, 3.1 and 5 4, 10, 19 
STATUTES 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 18, 19 
U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)(j) 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Corbin on Contracts, Section 193 19 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 90 13, 19 
ii 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0). T h e Utah Supreme Court "poured-over" this case to 
the Utah Court of Appeals on November 6, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Berger disagrees with the following statements contained in appellants' 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review: 
Hooper and Mansell incorrectly state at pages 2-3, paragraph B. that 
"Appellee's claims, whether breach of contract or promissory estoppel, are based on the 
premise that the Appellants acted wrongfully when they did not obtain the signature of 
Jane Boniakowski on the Listing Agreement." As discussed infra, Kay Berger, Inc.'s 
claim for commission is based upon a unilateral contract with Hooper and Mansell. 
Hooper and Mansell incorrectly state at page 3, paragraph C. that "Frank 
and Jane Boniakowski, not the appellants, wrongftiUy backed out of the escrow 
agreement." There was never any escrow agreement in connection with sale of the 
Boniakowski's home to the Chernows. Also, it is undisputed that Jane Boniakowski 
never signed the Listing Agreement for the home, and consequently there was nothing for 
her to rescind. 
Berger submits that the following statement more correctly frames the issues 
presented to this court for review: 
1. Did the Third District Court correctly hold that the uncontroverted 
material facts support summary judgment on Berger's promissory estoppel claim? 
1 
The standard for appellate review of orders granting summary judgment is 
that of correction of error and no deference is to be given to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); and 
2. Did the Third District Court correctly hold that Berger adequately pled 
her cause of action? 
The standard for appellate review of orders granting summary judgment is 
that of correction of error and no deference is to be given to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Sections 3 and 5.1 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Operation 
of the Multiple Listing Service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors state, inter alia.,: 
Section 3 Purpose: The Multiple Listing Service [MLS] is a 
means by which authorized participants make blanket 
unilateral offers of cooperation and compensation to other 
participants acting either as subagents, buyer's agents or both. 
* * * * 
Section 5.1 Agreement: All participants of the MLS before 
receiving service are required to sign an agreement that they 
have read, understand, accept and agree to abide by and 
faithfully observe the rules and regulations of the MLS. 
* * * * 
Section 18 Compensation Specified on each Listing: The 
listing broker shall specify on each listing filed with the 
Multiple Listing Service, the compensation offered to other 
multiple listing service participants for their services in the 
sale of such listing. Note 1. In filing a property with the 
Multiple Listing Service of a Board of Realtors the participant 
of the service is making a blanket unilateral offer of 
cooperation to the MLS participants, and shall therefore 
specif/ on each listing filed with the service, the 
compensation being offered to the other MLS participants. 
Specifying the compensation on each listing is necessary 
because the cooperating broker has the right to know what his 
compensation shall be prior to his endeavor to sell, [emphasis 
added] 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Berger concurs with appellants' description of the nature of the case, course 
of proceedings and disposition of the case below. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts were set forth in the Statement of Undisputed Facts 
contained in plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R 45-53) Hooper and Mansell specifically agreed in their responsive memorandum that 
they did not contest these facts for purposes of their own Countermotion for Summary 
Judgment. (R 119-120)1 
1. Hooper is an experienced Realtor who has been selling real estate in the 
Salt Lake City area since 1971. The vast majority of his experience has been with 
residential real estate. He has served two four-year terms as Director of the Salt Lake 
Board of Realtors, is a past-president of the Salt Lake Board and is currently serving a 
three-year term as Director of the Utah Association of Realtors. Hooper is currently an 
associate broker for Mansell. (R 45, 61-63). 
2. Barbara Harrison has been an active Realtor in Salt Lake City for seven 
years. During the relevant time frame she was an associate broker for Mansell. (R 45, 
92-93). 
3. Harrison met Frank Boniakowski at a party at Frank Boniakowski's 
home ("the Property"). She learned that Frank Boniakowski intended to sell the Property 
1
 Appellants' Countermotion for Summary Judgment was denied at the same time the court granted 
appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. 
4 
and she recommended that he use Hooper, because of Hooper's real estate expertise. 
Harrison's conversation with Frank Boniakowski occurred about a week before July 16, 
1993. (R 46, 93-95). 
4. Hooper and Harrison met with Frank Boniakowski several days prior 
to July 16th. At the initial meeting, Hooper and Harrison explained the services Mansell 
could provide. (R 46, 93-95). 
5. Hooper and Harrison met with Frank Boniakowski again on July 16th. 
At that time, Mr. Boniakowski agreed to list the Property for sale with Mansell. He gave 
Hooper and Mansell an exclusive listing for the property. (R 46,66,96). 
6. During the July 16th meeting, Hooper and Frank Boniakowski filled out 
a Multiple Listing Form, which was signed by Mr. Boniakowski, as owner of the 
property. Hooper and Frank Boniakowski also executed a Listing Contract. 
(R 46,66,105). 
7. Hooper knew from the time of his earliest meeting with Frank 
Boniakowski that Jane Boniakowski was a co-owner of the Property. He had obtained 
a printout regarding the Property from the County Assessor's office indicating that Frank 
and Jane Boniakowski were joint and several owners of the Property. (R 46-47,67). 
8. Hooper did not discuss with Frank Boniakowski at their first or second 
meeting the need for all owners to sign the Listing Contract. Hooper knew Jane 
Boniakowski was living in Canada at the time. (R 47,68,69). 
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9. After signing the Listing Contract, Hooper specifically asked Frank 
Boniakowski "do we need to send this paperwork to Jane for her signature or do you feel 
that she is in agreement with this price and selling the house." Frank Boniakowski 
indicated to Hooper that he had talked to Jane Boniakowski and that she was in 
agreement. Hooper relied on Frank Boniakowski's statement and never sent the Listing 
Contract to Jane Boniakowski for signature and never instructed Frank Boniakowski to 
do so. (R 47,70). 
10. It is Hooper's usual practice as a professional Realtor to obtain all 
owners signatures' on a Listing Contract. In this case he relied on Frank Boniakowski's 
representations as to Jane's wishes. It is also Harrison's practice as a professional 
Realtor to obtain signatures of all owners of Property on the Listing Contract as soon as 
possible. (R 47,71,97). 
11. Hooper believes that over the years he has reviewed the rules 
applicable to the MLS. He considers himself bound by the rules of the MLS and is 
generally familiar with the requirement that information submitted to the MLS be 
accurate. (48,72-73). 
12. Berger called Hooper on July 27th and informed him that she had a 
buyer for the Property. They arranged to meet at the Property that same day. The 
meeting took place on July 27th at the Property with Frank Boniakowski, Hooper, 
Harrison and Berger. (R 48,74-75,98). 
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13. Berger presented the Chernow's Earnest Money Sales Agreement to 
Frank Boniakowski, Hooper and Harrison. After some discussion Frank Boniakowski 
signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R 48,76,98,106-107). 
14. Hooper indicated that he would immediately send the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement to Jane Boniakowski in Canada for her signature via Federal Express. 
(R 48,77,98). 
15. At that time neither Hooper nor Harrison had informed Berger or the 
Chernows that Jane Boniakowski had never agreed in writing to list the Property. 
(R 48,88,99). 
16. Hooper never asked Frank Boniakowski whether he had power of 
attorney for Jane Boniakowski. (R 49,90). 
17. After the July 27th meeting, Berger and the Chernows proceeded with 
their inspections. Berger contacted Hooper sometime after their July 27th meeting and 
said the inspections had been completed. (R 49,78). 
18. Berger never stated to Hooper that the Chernows would not buy the 
Property if the foregoing three items were not taken care of by Boniakowski. 
(R 49,109). 
19. Frank Boniakowski contacted Harrison on August 6th by telephone. 
He informed Harrison that he had decided to not sell the home. Harrison strongly 
suggested that Frank Boniakowski contact Hooper. (R 49,100-101). 
20. Hooper received a telephone call from Frank Boniakowski informing 
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Hooper that he would not sell. This call occurred on or about August 6th. Hooper then 
called Berger and left a message on her telephone answering machine that Frank 
Boniakowski had decided to cancel the sale. (R 51,80-81). 
21. Berger contacted Hooper the next morning to discuss the situation with 
Hooper. During the course of the discussion Hooper stated to Berger that Jane 
Boniakowski was reftising to sign the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. At that point 
Berger asked Hooper whether he had obtained Jane Boniakowski's signature on the 
Listing Contract and Hooper told her that he had not. (R 51, 81-82). 
22. Hooper testified at his deposition that if a piece of real property is 
listed for a certain price on the MLS and Hooper's client offers that price, Hooper 
assumes that his client will be able to buy the property if no other conditions pertain. 
(R 51-52,87,89). 
23. Harrison does not have any properties listed on the MLS where all 
owners have not signed the Listing Contract. It is her customary practice as a Realtor 
to have all owners sign the Listing Contract. (R 52,102). 
24. When Harrison is acting as buyer's agent and is showing property listed 
on the MLS she assumes that all owners have authorized the property to be listed. 
(R 52,103). 
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25. The Rules and Regulations Governing the Operation of the Multiple 
Listing Service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors state, inter alia..: 
Section 3 Purpose: The Multiple Listing Service is a means 
by which authorized participants make blanket unilateral 
offers of cooperation and compensation to other participants 
acting either as subagents, buyer's agents or both. 
* * * * 
Section 5.1 Agreement: All participants of the MLS before 
receiving service are required to sign an agreement that they 
have read, understand, accept and agree to abide by and 
faithfully observe the rules and regulations of the MLS. 
* * * * 
Section 18 Compensation Specified on each Listing: The 
listing broker shall specify on each listing filed with the 
Multiple Listing Service, the compensation offered to other 
multiple listing service participants for their services in the 
sale of such listing. Note 1. In filing a property with the 
Multiple Listing Service of a Board of Realtors the participant 
of the service is making a blanket unilateral offer of 
cooperation to the MLS participants, and shall therefore 
specify on each listing filed with the service, the 
compensation being offered to the other MLS participants. 
Specifying the compensation on each listing is necessary 
because the cooperating broker has the right to know what his 
compensation shall be prior to his endeavor to sell, [emphasis 
added] 
(R 52-53) 
26. The Salt Lake Board of Realtors Residential/Condominium Data Input 
form prepared by David Hooper specifies in Section 3 entitled Listing Office Information 
that the buyer agency commission for the Property shall be three percent. (R 53,112). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Third District Court correctly held that Hooper and Mansell are liable 
to Berger based upon the equitable theory of promissory estoppel. Berger produced 
ready, willing and able buyers who accepted the price offered in the Listing Contract. 
The buyers were unable to purchase the Property and Berger did not receive her 
commission due to Hooper and Mansell's failure to obtain all listing owners' signatures 
on the Listing Contract. Regardless of Hooper and Mansell's failure to obtain 
authorization to sell the property, Hooper and Mansell are liable to Berger for her 3% 
commission. A unilateral contract was formed when Berger produced ready, willing and 
able buyers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Third District Court correctly held that the uncontroverted 
material facts support summary judgment in favor of Kay Berger, Inc., based upon 
the equitable theory of promissory estoppel. 
A. The material, uncontroverted facts support summary judgment. 
The Chernows retained Berger in July 1993 to act as their real estate agent 
in purchasing a home in Salt Lake City. (R 108) Berger found a home for the Chernows 
through the Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") in July 1993. 
(R 109) The home was located at 3628 Wasatch Cove Circle ("the Property") and was 
listed for $430,000. (R 105) 
The Chernows decided to accept the listing offer by submitting an Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement on the Property. Berger presented that Agreement to one of the 
10 
listed sellers, Frank Boniakowski, and Boniakowski's listing agents, Hooper and Barbara 
Harrison of Mansell & Associates. The Agreement was presented on July 27, 1993. 
(R 74-76,98,106-107) 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement presented by Berger was for the full 
listed price of the Property, $430,000. The only contingencies included in the Agreement 
were that the Chernows qualify for financing (which they subsequently did on a more 
expensive home) and that certain informational physical inspections of the home be 
completed. (R 106-107) 
Frank Boniakowski executed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on July 
27th. (R 107) Hooper represented that he would immediately send the Agreement to 
Jane Boniakowski, who was in Canada at the time, for her signature. (R 77,98) Jane 
Boniakowski was Frank Boniakowski's wife, and was a co-owner of the Property. (R 67) 
The Chernows and Berger retained inspectors to inspect the property and 
the inspections were satisfactorily completed. (R 78) The Chernows never indicated to 
Boniakowski, Hooper or Harrison that they intended to rely on the results of the 
inspections to rescind the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R 109) Berger faxed a 
letter to Hooper on August 4th indicating that all of the inspections were satisfactory. 
(RUl ) 
On August 7, 1993, Berger received a message that had been recorded on 
her company's answering machine on August 6th. The message was from Hooper and 
stated that Boniakowski had rescinded the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R 80-81) 
Berger subsequently learned that Hooper and Mansell had failed to obtain Jane 
Boniakowski's signature on the MLS Listing Contract for the Property. (R 81-82) This 
occurred despite Hooper's knowledge that Jane Boniakowski was a joint and several 
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owner of the Property. (R 67) Berger was never paid any commission on the Property, 
despite producing buyers who were ready, willing and able to pay the full amount of the 
listing price. 
B. The elements of promissory estoppel have been met 
Promissory estoppel is an equitable claim for relief. The factual 
prerequisites for promissory estoppel are: 
(1) a promise reasonably expected to induce reliance; (2) 
reasonable reliance inducing action or forbearance on the part 
of the promisee or third person; and (3) detriment to the 
promisee or third person. 
Weese v. Davis County Comm'n. 834 P.2d 1, n.17 (Utah 1992) 
Utah has also adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 90, 
which describes promissory estoppel as follows: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a 
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.. 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993). 
Hooper's listing on the MLS constituted a promise reasonably expected to 
induce reliance. Berger reasonably relied on the belief that if she produced ready, willing 
and able buyers for the full listing price of the property, Berger would receive her 3% 
commission from Hooper and Mansell. Berger suffered detriment as a result of Hooper 
and Mansell's actions; she expended substantial efforts to obtain ready, willing and able 
buyers and received no commission from Hooper and Mansell in return. 
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1. Promise 
The Listing Contract signed by Frank Boniakowski authorized Hooper and 
Mansell to sell the Property for $430,000.00. Frank Boniakowski promised to pay 
Hooper a seven percent commission if Hooper produced a buyer for the listed price. The 
Listing Contract specifically instructed and authorized Hooper and Mansell to place the 
listing on the MLS. Hooper and Mansell's listing on the MLS, together with the Rules 
and Regulations of the MLS and the Chernows' acceptance of the listing price, constituted 
a promise. Hooper and Mansell promised to pay Berger a three percent commission on 
the $430,000.00 listed price for the Property, if she produced ready, willing and able 
buyers for the property at the listed price. 
Participants in the MLS system agree to abide by and faithfully observe the 
Rules and Regulations of the MLS. Those Rules and Regulations include a clear 
statement that: 
In filing a property with the Multiple Listing Service of a 
Board of Realtors, the participant of the service is making a 
blanket unilateral offer of cooperation to the other MLS 
participants, and shall therefore specify on each listing file 
with the service, the compensation being offered to the other 
MLS participants. 
The nature of the MLS blanket unilateral offer is discussed in Roger Crane 
and Associates, Inc. v. Felice, 875 P.2d 705 (Wash.App. 1994). In Roger Crane, the 
court reviewed an action by a real estate broker and agency against a vendor and another 
broker seeking a portion of the real estate commission generated by the sale of a home. 
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Plaintiff Crane claimed to be a cooperating broker. In assessing the nature of an MLS 
listing agreement, the court stated: 
A listing agreement is a unilateral contract and until 
performance by Crane, the putative subagent, there was no 
obligation to pay Crane a commission. [Citations omitted]. 
The language of the MLS Restated Rules and Operational 
Procedures does not require a different result. Article I, 
section 1.1 of the MLS Restated Rules and Operational 
Procedures states that a listing creates a "blanket unilateral 
offer of subagency...". Here, the performance required by 
Crane to accept the unilateral offer of subagency, and 
create a binding contract, was presentment of a ready, 
willing and able buyer or presentment of an offer to 
purchase the Felice home, (emphasis added) 
Id. at 709 
The listing placed by Hooper and Mansell for the Property constituted a 
blanket unilateral offer to pay Kay Berger a three percent commission if she could 
produce a willing and able buyer at the listed price. Berger produced ready, willing and 
able buyers, thus creating a binding contract with Hooper and Mansell, but never 
received her commission from Hooper and Mansell. 
Hooper and Mansell have provided the court with a number of string 
citations to broker contract cases. The holdings support the general rule that if a seller 
signs a listing agreement with an agent and the agent finds a buyer who is ready, willing 
and able to buy at the listing price then the seller owes his agent the agreed upon 
commission. Berger does not quarrel with this notion, and in fact relies upon it in 
support of her unilateral contract with Hooper and Mansell. 
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2. Reasonable Reliance 
Berger and the Chernows reasonably relied on the information contained in 
the multiple listing. Hooper and Harrison admitted it is reasonable to expect that if one 
accepts the listing price for a piece of property, one will be able to purchase the property 
for that price. Neither Hooper nor Harrison ever told Berger or the Chernows that Jane 
Boniakowski had not authorized the sale of the property. As a result, Berger and the 
Chernows expended substantial time and effort in attempting to purchase the Property. 
It would be unjust to deny Berger her commission under these circumstances. 
Appellants argue that Berger has not established reasonable reliance 
sufficiently to prevail on her promissory estoppel claim. Appellants have overlooked 
Hooper's own admission in this regard; Hooper testified in his deposition that if real 
estate is listed for a certain price on the MLS and Hooper's client offers that price, 
Hooper assumes that his client will be able to buy the property if no other conditions 
pertain. (R 51-52,87,89) Mansell's employee, Barbara Harrison, testified at her 
deposition that it is her customary practice as a Realtor to have all owners sign the 
Listing Contract and that when she is acting as a buyer's agent and is showing property 
listed on the MLS she assumes that all owners have authorized the property to be listed. 
(R 52,102-103) 
Appellants argue that reasonable reliance presents a genuine issue of 
material fact precluding summary judgment. Berger does not quarrel with the notion that 
reasonable reliance is generally a question of fact. The problem with Hooper and 
Mansell's argument is that they did not controvert any of the material facts introduced by 
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Berger in support of Berger's motion for summary judgment. Since the material facts are 
uncontroverted the question of reasonable reliance can be resolved as a matter of 
law. 
Analogy can be drawn to the issue of proximate cause. Questions of 
proximate cause are generally reserved for the jury. Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). However the issue of proximate cause can 
be taken from the jury "where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to 
be derived from the evidence on proximate causation." Id. at 487, citing Roberton v. 
Sixpence Inns of America. Inc.. 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. 1990). 
Appellants characterize as an "enormous assumption" the notion that all 
owners of a parcel of real property must sign a multiple listing agreement in order for a 
broker to have proper authority to list the property. This completely misses the point. 
Sellers and their agents should be required to deal fairly with buyers and their agents. 
In this case, appellants did not deal fairly with Berger or the Chernows. Hooper and 
Mansell never told Berger or the Chernows that they did not have approval of all owners 
to sell the Property. As a result, Berger and the Chernows ended up wasting time and 
money. 
Hooper and Mansell essentially urge that the MLS should be informational 
only; buyers and agents would have to check each representation in a listing with all 
property owners before they could rely on that representation. The Multiple Listing 
Service is not merely informational. Hooper himself testified at his deposition that if a 
piece of real property is listed on the MLS for a certain price and Hooper's client offers 
that price, Hooper assumes that his client will be able to buy the property if no other 
conditions pertain. (R 51-52,87,89) Hooper did not characterize such an assumption as 
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"enormous" at his deposition. Additionally, real estate brokers who participate in the 
MLS expressly agree that "authorized participants make blanket unilateral offers of 
cooperation and compensation to other participants acting either as subagents, buyer's 
agents or both." (R 52-53) 
3. Detriment 
Berger clearly suffered detriment by not receiving her commission. Hooper 
and Mansell promised to pay Berger a three percent commission if she could produce a 
buyer at the listed price. Permitting Hooper and Mansell to withdraw this promise would 
be unfair and inequitable. 
C. Public policy grounds support the Third District Court's Order 
granting summary judgment. 
As a matter of public policy, this court should not permit seller's agents to 
escape the reasonably foreseeable consequences of listing properties for sale without 
obtaining authorization from all owners. Under Hooper and Mansell's approach, brokers 
could list property for sale on the MLS without any authorization from an owner. 
Participating agents and the public would be left without a remedy in cases where the 
owners decide not to honor the listing offer. 
If a broker elects to list a property on the MLS without proper owner 
authorization, it should be at that brokers' own peril. It would be patently unfair to 
expect subagents to expend time and effort to secure a ready, willing and able buyer with 
no reasonable expectation of earning a commission. That is precisely the reason the 
Rules and Regulations governing the MLS require listing agents to make a "blanket 
unilateral of cooperation and compensation." 
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II. The Third District Court correctly held that Berger 
adequately pled her causes of action. 
Appellants complain that plaintiffs did not specifically allege breach of 
contract in their Amended Complaint and claim Berger should therefore have been barred 
from presenting a breach of contract argument in Berger's Partial Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Appellants' argument fails on two grounds: 1) promises enforced under the 
theory of promissory estoppel are considered contracts and 2) Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure clearly provides for notice pleading. 
The definition of promissory estoppel relied upon by the Utah Supreme 
Court is set forth in Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. The supplemental notes 
to Section 90 refer to Sections 193-209 of Corbin on Contracts. Section 193 of Corbin 
on Contracts states in part: 
. . . there have always been informal promises that are 
enforceable without any expression of assent by the promisee 
and without any consideration in the sense of an equivalent 
given in exchange. These informal contracts are not 
"bargains" and are not made by the process of offer and 
acceptance. They are "unilateral" and not "bilateral" 
contracts. 
Appellants' brief ignores the fact that a binding promise under promissory 
estoppel theory is a unilateral contract. Appellants brief also ignores the well-established 
Utah law on the subject of notice pleading. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Blackham v. Snelgrove. 3 U.2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955) "a complaint is 
required to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." 
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The Amended Complaint in this case more than meets the requirements of 
Rule 8. Detailed factual allegations outline the nature and basis of plaintiffs' claims. 
(R 16-22) The mere fact that plaintiffs did not plead a separate cause of action for breach 
of contract is immaterial; a fair reading of the Amended Complaint makes clear the nature 
and scope of Berger's claims. 
Appellants' claim there is no contractual language of which they are aware, 
whether written or oral, that obligates the appellants to pay a commission to Berger. 
(Appellants' brief, pp. 21-22) The terms of Arnold's contract with Mansell and Hooper 
are clearly stated in the Rules and Regulations Governing the Operation of the MLS: the 
MLS "is a means by which authorized participants make blanket unilateral offers of 
cooperation and compensation to other participants acting either as subagents, buyer's 
agents or both." Hooper and Mansell explicitly offered to pay Berger a 3% commission 
if she produced a ready, willing and able buyer. Berger produced ready, willing and able 
buyers but never received her 3% commission from Mansell and Hooper. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the Third District Court's order granting Berger 
summary judgment for her 3% commission in the amount of $14,914.52. 
DATED this [J_ day of November, 1995. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
D.'GARY CHRISTIAN 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellee Kay Berger, Inc. 
19 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this / T a a y of 
November, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees Kay Berger, 
inc., Marvin Chernow and Marilyn Chernow, to the following: 
David O. Black 
1245 Brickyard Road 
Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
W\ /MAAAA 
v
 (1 
l^Jfl&rrtd/LJ 
20 
